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Pursuant to URAP 35, William Lowe and Augusta Rose petition for
rehearing. Their counsel, Robert Henry Copier, certifies that this petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay. This petition seeks to have the
award of attorney fees for failure to meet appellate briefing requirements
removed from this court's Opinion of December 6, 2007, in that the court
misapprehended the success of appellants in meeting all their objectives on
appeal, misapprehended the briefing strategy successfully employed by
appellants in successfully securing those objectives, misapprehended the
briefing tactics employed by appellants in successfully pursuing that strategy,
and granted attorney fees in error even though appellee's request for fees
included neither applicable citations nor a properly developed argument.
I.

Implicit in the award of attorney fees is the assumption by this

court that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose failed to meet their objectives on
appeal. This is a misapprehension. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose had two
objectives. The first was to secure a holding from this appellate court that
the April 26, 2005, trial court ruling and order that favorably disposed of the
contempt claims against them was a final, appealable order that Ms. Ninow
did not appeal within 30 days. By securing such a holding, Mr. Lowe and
Ms. Rose assert that the res judicata thereby in place should put a stop to
serial contempt motions Ms. Ninow has attempted to pursue against them.
The second objective was to secure a holding that their removal as
officers and directors on August 16, 2005, was substantively identical to the
finding of fact made in 2003 that they had been removed in 2002 and that
the order made in August 16, 2005, was effective nunc pro tunc to the earlier
date of removal. By securing that objective, they have solidified their status
as both officers and a quorum of directors of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office,
Inc., from the death of Gary Pahl in June of 2000 through mid-May of 2002.

It was proper to get such a holding, because in her initial TRO moving
papers in May of 2002, Ms Ninow had claimed that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose
had never been officers or directors. As this would have required a jury trial
of facts as to which Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose were the only living witnesses,
Ms. Ninow backed off from this when moving for the summary judgment in
2002 and, instead, obtained a factual finding that they had been removed by
unanimous shareholder action in mid-May of 2002. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose
can live with that, since it means they were officers and directors until then.
The December 6, 2007, holding now solidifies that status even more.
II.

Implicit in the award of attorney fees is the assumption by this

court that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose either had no appellate briefing
strategy or that their strategy failed. This is a misapprehension. The
strategy employed by Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose on appeal was to leave as
little to chance as possible by coaxing their adversary, Ms. Ninow, to argue
on appeal that the April 26, 2005, trial court ruling and order that favorably
disposed of the contempt claims against them was a final, appealable order,
and that their removal as officers and directors on August 16, 2005, was
substantively identical to the finding of fact made in 2003 that they had been
removed in 2002 and that the order made in August 16, 2005, was effective
nunc pro tunc to the earlier date of removal. By getting their adversary to
argue in favor of what they wanted [see Brief of Appellee, LC at p. 21; ILB
at p. 24], Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose successfully pursued this briefing strategy.
III.

Implicit in the award of attorney fees is the assumption by this

court that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose either utilized no appellate briefing
tactics to support their strategy or that their tactics failed. This is a
misapprehension. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose utilized two tactics to pursue
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their strategy of getting their adversary, Ms. Ninow, to argue in favor of that
which Mr. Lowe and Ms. litose desired to achieve on appeal. The first of
these tactics was to raise issues that would make it prudent for Ms. Ninow to
so argue, since all alternatives were more risky and burdensome. Ms. Ninow
was faced with such a choice between arguing that the April 26, 2005, trial
court ruling and order that favorably disposed of the contempt claims against
Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose was a final and appealable order, or the much more
risky and burdensome alternative of arguing that the ruling and order should
be disregarded, which would mean there was no final order until August 16,
2005, and that this court could reach and restore the November 26, 2002,
default judgment. In facing that choice, Ms. Ninow declined to choose and
argued both sides of the question. [See Brief of Appellee, II. A at p. 22; II.B
at p. 24.] This court decided for her by stating in dicta that the order might
have been inadvertently entered but holding that it was a final, appealable
order that had to be appealed within 30 days.1 Ms. Ninow was also faced
with a choice between arguing that the August 16, 2005, order was effective
nunc pro tunc to the earlier May 1, 2003, finding [which she attempted to do
at Brief of Appellee I.C at p. 21] and thereby expose herself to risk that Mr.
Lowe and Ms. Rose were wrongfully enjoined from May 26, 2005, until
August 16, 2005, because they had already been removed as officers, or to
continue to try to argue that they were not wrongfully enjoined by arguing
1

There is nothing in the trial court record by which the trial court indicated
she had signed the April 26, 2005, order inadvertently, Speculation in that
regardj}y Ms. Ninow in her brief and by this court in dicta is unfair to |he
trial court in that it calls into question her attentiveness and scholarship. It is
more likely that she intentionally entered the April 26, 2005, order and then
forgot about it later when Ms. Ninow kept on filing serial contempt motions.
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no final order had yet entered. Since this would again have cieated a risk
that this court would reach and reinstate the November 26, 2002, default
judgment, it was very prudent for Ms. Nmow to argue that the removal had
been concluded by final, appelable order m 2003. The second tactic used
by Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose to subtly channel Ms. Nmow into arguing m
favor of what Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose wanted involved appellate briefing
work that is both proprietary and protected by the attorney work product
privilege It is sufficient to state for these purposes that it involves use by
the undersigned attorney/CPA of probability analysis and the quantifying of
prior behavior by opposing counsel to predict how an adversary will respond
during the litigation process when confronted with specific types of briefing.
Those experiments were successful and the predictions were accurate
IV.

The court overlooked the fact that the appellee's request for fees

included neither citations that were on-point nor a properly developed
argument, and it was therefore error to grant an award of attorney fees.
Ms. Nmow's argument for attorney fees under URAP 24(k) is only
three paragraphs long. [See Brief of Appellee, VIII.D, pp. 46-47] She cites
only one case, State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, Par. 11, 99 P.3rd 820. That case
is inapplicable here because it is a case where the court disregarded portions
of a brief, but did not award any fees. Appellate courts routinely decline to
consider portions of briefs, most often when appellants attempt to challenge
factual findings without meeting the marshaling requirement. As a case m
which the court disregarded portions of a brief, but did not award fees, State
v. Green, Id., provides no precedent >r guidance as to specific circumstances
under which a court should hold that a brief is so extraordinarily deficient m
terms of its briefing quality that an award of attorney fees under URAP 24(k)
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should be made in lieu of or in addition to simply disregarding all or part of
the brief. That case stands only for the proposition that a court may award
fees under URAP 24(k), a settled legal principle apparent from the rule itself.
Ms. Ninow then failed to properly develop an argument. She failed to
identify any specific pages or paragraphs in the Amended Opening Brief that
should be disregarded or stricken, and as a result of that, this court's decision
of December 6, 2007, neither strikes any portion of the brief nor identifies
any brief sentence or paragraph that the court is disregarding for an alleged
failure to meet appellate briefing requirements. Ms. Ninow argues at the
beginning of the second paragraph of her three-paragraph argument that the
Amended Opening Brief "failed to include a summary of arguments .. ." but
she makes no citation to the Amended Opening Brief to try to demonstrate
this assertion. The Amended Opening Brief, in fact, includes "a summary of
arguments." A "Summary of Arguments" is on page 21 and the "Table of
Contents" lists the said "Summary of Arguments" as appearing on page 21.
She then asserts, without references to the brief and without specific
examples, that the entire opening brief is convoluted, verbose, rambling and
an incredibly tedious read. Because Ms. Ninow did not favor the reader with
any specific examples, appellants' counsel reread his brief and found it to be
neither convoluted, verbose, rambling, nor tedious, and also concluded that
even a single read-through by Ms. Ninow should have caused her to easily
conclude that she should respond with a relatively short brief in which she
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the April 26, 2005, order
was a final, appealable order, that judicial removal of William Lowe and
Augusta Rose and lifting of the preliminary injunction on August 16, 2005,
was an unnecessary redundancy that related back nunc pro tunc to the final,
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appealable order entered on May I, 2003, and that therefore she did not need
to argue anything further in response. She attempted to argue this, but then
unnecessarily went on to attack the character of appellants' counsel at great
length and to argue the matters as to which the court would likely hold that it
lacked jurisdiction once Ms. Ninow conceded that the April 26, 2005, ruling
and order was a final, appealable order that neither side had timely appealed.
Ms. Ninow further fails to properly develop an argument when she
concedes that the "Oseguera issue" is addressed in appellants' opening brief
with "traditional legal argument and analysis with support by citations to
proper legal authority" [Brief of Appellee, p. 47, Par. 1] but then fails to
show why there should be an award of attorney fees in light of this. As this
court noted in its Opinion, most of the Amended Opening Brief is devoted to
this "Oseguera issue" and Ms. Ninow concedes that issue was briefed with
"traditional legal argument and analysis with support by citations to proper
legal authority." Indeed, in briefing the "Oseguera issue," almost all of the
brief is devoted to the third-prong of the analysis to be employed in deciding
whether it was proper to set aside the November 26, 2002, default judgment
on June 12, 2003, i.e., whether Ms. Ninow had presented a defense of at
least ostensible merit. [The first two prongs were also properly briefed, i.e.,
whether the motion to set aside the default judgment needed to be filed by
the 3 month 60(b) deadline and whether Ms. Ninow had provided plausible
justification for her failure to timely respond to the initial summons within
20 days and her failure to timely move for relief from judgment within the
30 month 60(b) deadline.] In briefing that third prong, appellants went
beyond simply showing that the sole defense that had been raised by Ms.
Ninow had no ostensible merit under the law of the case [because, when
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faced squarely with that issue, Judge Medley ruled against Ms. Nmow and
dismissed the shareholder derivative actions without prejudice instead of
with prejudice]. In going beyond simply showing that the sole defense that
she had raised had no ostensible ment under the law of the case, appellants
broadly surveyed the history of this case to demonstrate the absence of any
other defenses of at least ostensible ment. Since the burden was on Ms.
Nmow to show that she had a defense of at least ostensible ment [and not on
appellants to show that she lacked one], this demonstration in the brief of the
absence of any other defenses of at least ostensible merit was broad but not
deep Appellants were not required to serve aces. Instead, they were only
required to lob the ball onto Ms. Nmow's side of the court and give her the
choice of either trying to return it, or, as she did, declare the game over [by
conceding that the April 26, 2005, ruling and order was final and appealable].
The Amended Opening Bnef was written under the real possibility
that this court would hold that neither the April 26, 2005, order nor the
August 16, 2005, order were final orders, a question still open at the oral
argument that was raised by the court at the oral argument. It was written to
send a message to Ms. Nmow that if she did not concede that the April 26,
2005, order was a final, appealable order, that this court might dismiss this
appeal as premature for absence of a final, appealable order. At that point,
Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose would likely have taken a URCP 54(b) run at
getting the November 26, 2002, default judgment reinstated by Judge
Kennedy, based on their "traditional legal argument and analysis with
support by citations to proper legal authority" and the lack ofany ostensible
defense on the merits. In order to avoid that possibility, it was prudent for
Ms. Nmow to take the position that the April 26, 2005, ruling and order was
-7-

final and appealable, which is what appellants wanted her to do in order to-put an end to Ms. Ninow's pursuit of them, since, Ms. Ninow was still trying
to keep the dispute going by trying to still keep appellants under injunction.
The basic point of disagreement between the parties in July of 2005
was Ms. Ninow's assertion that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose should be kept
under injunction because they had been removed as officers and directors
and the position taken by Ms. Rose that the said matter should be dismissed
because their removal as officers and directors was an adequate remedy at
law and that any injunction thereafter was wrongful. The court sided with
Ms. Rose when she again dismissed on August 16, 2005. The Amended
Opening Brief was written to give real incentive to KaLynn Ninow to keep
things that way and to not try to keep this legal dispute going in perpetuity.
The brief thus achieved its purpose of getting Ms. Ninow to choose to
end this dispute by conceding that the April 26, 2005, order was final and
appealable so she could avoid risking a ruling that neither the April 26, 2005,
order nor the August 16, 2005, were final and leaving appellants free to take
a 54(b) shot at getting the November 26, 2002, judgment reinstated by Judge
Kennedy. This purpose might not have been achieved if appellants had not
broadly written about all of the case factors vitiating any defense of at least
ostensible merits vis-a-vis the November 26, 2002, default judgment. Since
appellants achieved all the goals they were pursuing in writing their brief the
way they did, arguing that they did not meet appellate briefing requirements
is akin to WWII-era French generals arguing that the Germans could never
have breached the Maginot Line even though the Panzers were already in
Paris, having done an end-run through the Low Countries. In like manner,
the brief at issue was written for a specific purpose that was fully achieved.
-8-

Had the Amended Opening Brief not been written the way it was, Ms.
Ninow would likely have perceived no downside in attempting to keep this
dispute going in the trial court by arguing that the April 26, 2005, order was
an inadvertent order that should be treated as nullity and that the August 16,
2005, order was not a final, appealable order because it expressly reserved
some claims as to some parties for future litigation. Because the brief as
written demonstrated that trying to keep the dispute going could lead to
having Judge Kennedy3 take a look under URCP 54(b) at reinstating the
2

See, inter alia, the July, 2005, dispute over the injunction as framed in the
papers appended to the Amended Opening Brief. At R.3081 Ms. Ninow
argues on July 8, 2005, that only the contempt proceeding remains and that
as part of that "there is no need to have the preliminary injunction lifted as
the record in this case clearly shows that Respondents have been removed as
officers and directors of the Loan Office and that they have no authority to
act on behalf of the Loan Office." In reply, Augusta Rose argues on July 15,
2005, at R. 3094 that "the record in this case shows that respondents have
been removed as officers and directors of the Loan Office and that they have
no authority to act on behalf of the Loan Office. Because removal of
respondents as officers and directors constitutes an adequate remedy at law,
there is no basis to keep them under preliminary injunction in the face of
said legal remedy.5' The trial court agreed with Ms. Rose, and dismissed on
August 16, 2005, with express reference to Ms. Ninow's July 8, 2005, filing.
3

Judge Kennedy took over for Judge Lewis. Judge Lewis regularly had her
openly disseminated judicial evaluation scores dragged down by low marks
for her appearance of bias. The undersigned believes that for a number of
years he basked in the warm glow of bias in his favor by Judge Lewis as he
watched his perplexed and exasperated adversaries in her courtroom trying
to make sense of why they were losing. When he perceived that the winds
of bias had inexplicably shifted against him, the undersigned moved to have
Judge Lewis removed from all of his cases including this probate, two white
collar criminal defense cases, and another probate. She was removed from
this probate and the two white collar criminal cases and was then defeated in
a retention election before the motion in the other probate was ever acted on.
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November 26, 2002, default judgment due to a lack of a defense of at least
ostensible merit and the inapplicability of Qseguera to this case, she chose
the most prudent path by conceding that the April 26, 2005, order was final.
SinceMs. Ninow concedes that the "Qseguera argument" was briefed
with "traditional legal argument and analysis with support by citations to
proper legal authority" and since almost the entire brief is devoted to the
showing of an absence of lack of defense of at least ostensible merit under
that analysis, it was error for the Court of Appeals to award attorney fees.
REQUEST FOR HEARING
While URAP 24(k) provides no express right to hearing upon request
comparable to the one provided for at in URAP 33(c)(3), this court should
either remove the award of attorney fees from its Opinion or should grant a
hearing to the appellants. Because Ms. Ninow did not properly develop her'
three paragraph argument for URAP 24(k) fees, and because appellants fully
responded to and met the argument she did make, there should be no award
of attorney fees under URAP 24(k) without a hearing providing due process.
CONCLUSION
The award of attorney fees under/dRXP 24(k) should be removed.
DATED THIS 19th DAY OF DECEMBER, 200^]

ROBER^4lEN^rCOPIER
AttoaieyibpB^endants
William Lowe and Augusta Rose
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DANIEL F. VAN WOERKOM
SANDRA K. WEEKS
HALA L. AFU
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